Reasons without Rationalism has two related parts, devoted to action theory and ethics, respectively. In the second part, I argue for a close connection between reasons for action and virtues of character. This connection is mediated by the idea of good practical thought and the disposition to engage in it. The argument relies on the following principle, which is intended as common ground: " Reasons: The fact that p is a reason for A to ϕ just in case A has (...) a collection of psychological states, C, such that the disposition to be moved to ϕ by C-and-the-belief-that- p is a good disposition of practical thought, and C contains no false beliefs."In effect, reasons are premises for episodes of sound practical thinking whose other conditions already …. (shrink)

Can we have objective knowledge of right and wrong, of how we should live and what there is reason to do? Can it be anything but luck when our moral beliefs are true? Kieran Setiya confronts these questions in their most compelling and articulate forms, and argues that if there is objective ethical knowledge, human nature is its source.

Argues for a conception of reasons as premises of practical reasoning. This conception is applied to questions about ignorance, advice, enabling conditions, "ought," and evidence.

Argues that it is not by inference from intention that I know what I am doing intentionally. Instead, the reverse is true: groundless knowledge of intention rests on the will as a capacity for non-perceptual, non-inferential knowledge of action. The argument adapts and clarifies considerations of "transparency" more familiar in connection with belief.

In recent scholarship, a widely agreed upon definition of post-truth has proved elusive, particularly because the term is used in tandem with so-named alternative facts, fake news, misinformation, and references to an anti-expert, anti-intellectual climate. This paper will consider recent educators’ efforts in the Australasian region to address the political and cultural disruption that post-truth has evoked, by inquiring into how their pedagogy mirrors or differs from that used in public spaces by protest movements. In the first section, scholarship on (...) post-truth will be examined for how it constitutes a form of revisionist history, in which the present has been corrupted over time by comparison to a more idealised and distant past. The second section will focus on how theories about the construction of knowledge, such as Latour’s notion of hybridised modernity and notions of historical consciousness, can be used to frame forms of activism as means to educate the public and disrupt the dominant political ideologies. The focus in the last section will be on examining how educators might enable learners’ critical literacy so they can accommodate and overcome the negativity, cynicism, and disempowerment which characterises a post-truth paradigm. (shrink)

Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for (...) debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Infirmity -- Loneliness -- Grief -- Failure -- Injustice -- Absurdity -- Hope.

Argues that the view propounded in "Practical Knowledge" (Ethics 118: 388-409) survives objections made by Sarah Paul ("Intention, Belief, and Wishful Thinking," Ethics 119: 546-557). The response gives more explicit treatment to the nature and epistemology of knowing how.

The aim of this article is to outline a pragmatist image of science following Rorty’s discussions and critics of epistemology and to develop some consequences of it in the philosophical analysis and its relations to culture. I will deal with some aspects of how scientific practice is construed and understood, and also outline the shift in Philosophy of Science from epistemological to ethical-political concerns that are implied in his proposal. I will contend that this perspective suggests an interesting way of (...) analysing scientific practices, theories, and public policies of it. Furthermore, I will suggest that it successfully connects the most interesting proposals of contemporary scientific views in philosophy. Finally, I will use some examples in physics and biology to illustrate my assertions. (shrink)

In this collection, Kieran Setiya explores the place of agency in ethics, arguing for a causal theory of intentional action on which it is understood through the knowledge embodied in our intentions, and against the rationalist project of deriving norms of practical reason from the nature of the will.

It is argued that instrumentalizing the value of art does an injustice to artistic appreciation and provides a hostage to fortune. Whilst aestheticism offers an intellectual bulwark against such an approach, it focuses on what is distinctive of art at the expense of broader artistic values. It is argued that artistic appreciation and creativity involve not just skills but excellences of character. The nature of particular artistic or appreciative virtues and vices are briefly explored, such as snobbery, aestheticism and creativity, (...) in order to motivate a virtue theoretic approach. Artistic virtues are intrinsically valuable excellences of character that enable us to create or appreciate all sorts of things from everyday recipes to the finest achievements of humankind. Such an approach offers a new way to resist the age old temptation to instrumentalize the values of art. (shrink)

I will relate some social and epistemic aspects involved in the conceptual development of the genetic model in the early Molecular Biology. I will use the link between Biology and Physics as a framework, which supports such assumptions, providing new methodologies, but mainly as a framework that provides a model of objectivity developed within Modern Tradition. Finally, I will interpret this relationship from the pragmatist perspective to embrace Rorty’s thesis on «the ontological priority of the social» which implies understanding biology (...) as a part of a general cultural politics. (shrink)

Argues for a "cognitivist" account of the instrumental principle, on which it is the application of theoretical reason to the beliefs that figure in our intentions. This doctrine is put to work in solving a puzzle about instrumental reason that plagues alternative views.

Examining the complex role that motivation plays in creativity foregrounds the role of intrinsic motivation in paradigmatic cases of creative achievement. This is significant given the neglect of the role of motivation in the philosophical literature. Furthermore, given the way in which intrinsic motivation typically grounds and enables the cultivation of creativity for creatures like us, it pays to think of creativity in virtue-theoretic terms. As suggested by both empirical and conceptual considerations, intrinsic motivation insulates agents from pressures against or (...) inhibitors of creativity. It helps to explain robustness across different situations and influences. Conceiving of creativity as a virtue of character also makes best sense of how and why we praise or criticize as we do and shows us how to cultivate creativity. (shrink)

Bilimin ne olduğunun belirlenmesi ve bu bağlamda bilimin sözde bilim ya da bilimsel olmayan alanlara ilişkin sınırının nasıl çizileceği tartışması, bilim felsefesinde sınır çizme problemi olarak ele alınmaktadır. Çalışmanın ana konusunu oluşturan bu problem, özellikle yirminci yüzyıldan itibaren, bilim felsefecileri tarafından birçok ölçüt ortaya konularak çözümlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu ölçütler genellikle, bilim ile sözde bilim arasındaki sınırı belirlemek amacıyla, bilimi mantık ve mantıksal önermeler üzerinden değerlendirmektedir. Şu ana kadar Viyana Çevresi, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos gibi filozoflarca ortaya konulan ölçütler, nihai olarak problemi (...) mantıksal açıdan ele almıştır. Sınır çizme sorununun mantıksal açıdan ya da mantıksal ifadeler aracılığıyla ele alınması demek; sorunu içeriği yerine daha çok biçimsel açıdan ele almak anlamına gelmektedir. Ayrıca, ifade, kuram, araştırma programı gibi bilim öğelerinin bilimsellik durumunu tespit edebilmek amacıyla önerilen ölçütün, tek tek gerekli ve hep birlikte yeterli olan uygun sınır çizme ölçütünü karşılaması anlamına da gelmektedir. Bu çalışma, gerek ve yeter koşul arayışının, bilimin değişken ve çeşitli yapısını tam olarak yakalayamayacağını ve bilimin belirlenmesinin ve sınırının çizilmesinin bu yöntemle mümkün olmayacağını vurgulamaktadır. Bu konunun mutlaka sosyolojik açıdan da ele alınması gerekmektedir. Bilimin sosyal yapısına, değerler sistemine de bakmamız gerekir. Sonuç olarak, sınır çizme probleminin gerek ve yeter koşulun ortaya koyduğu katı ve ortak özellikler üzerinden sonuçlandırılamayacağı, bunun yerine bilimin “aile benzerliği yaklaşımı” çerçevesinde ele alınması gerektiği vurgulanacaktır. Aile benzerliği yaklaşımının temel oluşturduğu çok boyutlu ölçüt, bu sorunun çözümünde sosyal etkenleri dâhil etmesi, bilimin çeşitliliğini kapsayabilecek ölçüde çoklu ve esnek yapıda olması ile katkıda bulunacaktır. (shrink)

Philosophical wisdom and practical advice for overcoming the problems of middle age How can you reconcile yourself with the lives you will never lead, with possibilities foreclosed, and with nostalgia for lost youth? How can you accept the failings of the past, the sense of futility in the tasks that consume the present, and the prospect of death that blights the future? In this self-help book with a difference, Kieran Setiya confronts the inevitable challenges of adulthood and middle age, (...) showing how philosophy can help you thrive. You will learn why missing out might be a good thing, how options are overrated, and when you should be glad you made a mistake. You will be introduced to philosophical consolations for mortality. And you will learn what it would mean to live in the present, how it could solve your midlife crisis, and why meditation helps. Ranging from Aristotle, Schopenhauer, and John Stuart Mill to Virginia Woolf and Simone de Beauvoir, as well as drawing on Setiya’s own experience, Midlife combines imaginative ideas, surprising insights, and practical advice. Writing with wisdom and wit, Setiya makes a wry but passionate case for philosophy as a guide to life. (shrink)

Argues that inadvisable procreative acts should often be affirmed in retrospect. This shift is not explained by attachment or love but by the moral impact of existence.

Argues that, in acting for a reason, one takes that reason to explain one's action, not to justify it: reasons for acting need not be seen "under the guise of the good". The argument turns on the need to explain the place of "practical knowledge" - knowing what one is doing - in intentional action. A revised and expanded version of this material appears in Part One of "Reasons without Rationalism" (Princeton, 2007).

Argues from the possibility of basic intentional action to a non-propositional theory of knowing how. The argument supports a broadly Anscombean conception of the will as a capacity for practical knowledge.

For over a decade, Reiner Schürmann considered his phenomenology of symbolic action to be the centerpiece of his philosophical project. After 1980, however, it drops out entirely. This article argues that a central tension surrounding this theory lies in its complex reliance on categories sourced from nineteenth- and twentieth-century theorists of mythology. In his theory of “symbolic difference,” Schürmann attempts to extract from the experience of mythic epiphany and ritual the groundwork for a philosophy of collective action liberated from any (...) reference to ulterior origins. This effort to return to myth in search of the post-metaphysical generates a tension that will come to a head in the late 1970s, when Schürmann attempts to purge the mythic content from his symbolism, with only partial success. The eventual failure of this demythologization, it is here argued, casts new light on the category of “natality” in Broken Hegemonies. (shrink)

Argues that, for Anscombe, 'practical knowledge' is only sometimes 'the cause of what it understands.' It is the formal cause when its object is 'formally the description of an executed intention.' Nor is such knowledge confined to the present progressive: we have practical knowledge of the future and the past.

Argues from the planning theory of intention – as an account of means-end coherence – to a comprehensive form of ethical rationalism. Having raised objections to this result, the paper ends by sketching a way out.

Argues for a deflationary account of epistemic agency. We believe things for reasons and our beliefs change over time, but there is no further sense in which we are active in judgement, inference, or belief.

William H. Poteat’s critique of Cartesianism is an amplification of the philosophical work of Michael Polanyi. Poteat applies Polanyian methods to articulate an alternative to the metaphysical dualism that, he argues, still dominates Western reflective thought at a tacit level. His argument is that the novel logic of Polanyi’sPersonal Knowledge puts the presuppositions of the modern philosophical tradition in question. In the elaboration of this focal argument, Poteat’s subsidiary acceptance of Polanyi’s anterior work is total. Nevertheless it remains important to (...) disambiguate the thought of the two philosophers. In this essay, I argue that Poteat’s reliance on Polanyi as means of elaborating his own original philosophical position is perhaps what is most distinctive of this relationship. For Poteat relies on Polanyian grounds ontologically to the extent that, once assimilated, these supporting grounds are finally cancelled. I argue that even if it is ultimatelyimpossible to locate the precise point where Polanyi ends and Poteat begins, it remains necessary to attempt a clean separation. For only in this way can Poteat’s unique contribution to philosophy be focally appreciated. (shrink)

Argues, against Anscombe, that Aristotle had the concept of morality as an interpersonal normative order: morality is justice in general. For an action to be wrong is not for it to warrant blame, or to wrong another person, but to be something one should not do that one has no right to do. In the absence of rights, morality makes no sense.

This paper explores the implications of a Civil Economy approach to consumer ethics, by addressing the idea that Antonio Genovesi’s (1713–1769) notion of _mutual assistance_ can be understood in terms of _collective intentionality_ or _team reasoning_. I try to give reasons for this idea by a careful examination of Genovesi’s conception of social life and human agency and by reading it through the lens of team reasoning. I argue that this understanding of mutual assistance may imply broad constraints over agents’ (...) choices whenever they conflict with the good of society. Then I explore the implications of a mutual assistance approach to market ethics in a global society, where conflicting views of good and different group affiliations are possible. (shrink)

A common argument against lockdowns is that they restrict freedom. On this view, lockdowns might be effective in protecting public health, but their impact on freedom is purely negative. This article challenges that view. It argues that while lockdowns restrict freedom, so too do viruses. Since viruses restrict freedom and lockdowns protect us from viruses, lockdowns can protect us from the harmful effects that viruses have on freedom. The problem we face is not necessarily freedom versus public health. Sometimes it (...) is freedom itself—or its value or distribution—that provides reason for lockdowns. (shrink)

This essay reviews Theatre, Communication, Critical Realism (2010) by Tobin Nellhaus. It begins by outlining the objective of the book and proceeds to evaluate its central argument. The objective is to develop a theory of theatre founded on the premises of critical realism and thereby theoretically situate theatrical performance in its socio-cultural matrix. The argument is that critical realism is effective for developing a comprehensive account of theatrical performance because it has the capacity to reveal truths about the structure of (...) social reality (that correspond to those articulated by critical realism). In the second part of the review, employing the methods of conceptual analysis, I propose that Nellhaus’s thesis of ‘ontological doubling’ (which claims that performance doubles human agency) is undermined by certain epistemological presuppositions regarding the ontology of fictional characters. (shrink)

The hegemonic discourse on humanism in the contemporary academy – a critical discourse in the form of a theoretical anti-humanism – is marked by a certain degree of impoverishment. This impoverishment is the result of many contextual factors, including the ideological purposes to which the discourse has been put, but also the effects of internal workings of the paradigm associated with anti-humanism itself. In this article, I trace the development of this discourse in its foundational early- and mid-twentieth century manifestations, (...) outlining its central characteristics as well as its tensions and aporias, both theoretical and political. I argue that the critical discourse, which has informed our contemporary understanding of humanism, needs to be meaningfully sublated and that a new discourse – one that has reflected deeply upon the anti-humanist discourse: its strengths and its weaknesses – should take its place. (shrink)

El siguiente trabajo pretende mostrar algunas conexiones ontológicas y epistemológicas entre los supuestos que subyacen en la conservación de la energía en física y la teoría del valor en economía clásica. Para ello, en primer lugar, haré una reconstrucción de ciertos supuestos metafísicos y hallazgos empíricos que guían la configuración de la conservación de la energía, desde la época de Descartes hasta su elaboración formal por parte de Helmholtz, como principio termodinámico. A continuación, describiré cómo encontramos supuestos equivalentes, con otra (...) elaboración, que guían las preocupaciones sobre el valor en los economistas clásicos en Smith, Ricardo y particularmente en Marx, y sus respectivas conexiones con la física. Finalmente conectaré estos paralelismos que se siguen de tales construcciones, que a su vez provienen de supuestos comunes e inmersos en la cultura y que interactúan en este caso en física y economía. Con ello argumentaré en favor de una perspectiva no autónoma de la ciencia, determinada por tales factores culturales de su tiempo. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo haré uso del cambio conceptual gestado en la primera parte del siglo XX con el nacimiento de la teoría cuántica y su interpretación basada en el principio de complementariedad e indeterminación, elaborados por Niels Bohr y Werner Heisenberg respectivamente, para argumentar a favor de la demarcación de la ciencia que defiende Richard Rorty. Con este propósito retomaré algunos elementos del desarrollo histórico y características de las nuevas explicaciones de la ciencia cuántica respecto de la física clásica (...) para diluir la diferencia entre búsqueda de la verdad y deliberación práctica. Con ello defenderé una relación causal entre el mundo y nuestras descripciones en oposición a una representacional, así como una concepción pragmatista del conocimiento, siguiendo la propuesta del!lósofo norteamericano. Como consecuencia, defenderé que no existe una distinción de tipo epistemológica entre la ciencia y otros discursos; no hay diferencia metodológica que marque una distinción ontológica o viceversa entre ciencia y otras cosas. Sosteniendo así, una indiferencia o pluralidad ontológica, es decir, que todos los discursos están en pie de igualdad.In this paper I will use the conceptual change between Quantum and Classical Mechanics to support the science demarcation proposed by Richard Rorty. I will rescue some characteristics of the historical development on Quantum Mechanics until the Prnciple of Complementarity´s formulation to dissolve the di"erence between the search of the truth and practical deliberation. #en I will to criticize a representational conception of knowledge to defend a pragmatist one, such as the american philospher does. As a conesequence, I will dissolve the epistemological distinction between science and other speeches, and so, the ontological one too. (shrink)

Pretendo mostrar como o tema da biopolítica pode se articular com o tema do niilismo. Para isso, concentrarei a atenção em expor esquematicamente alguns dos principais argumentos de Roberto Esposito que autorizam aquela articulação. Assim, primeiramente, considerarei os elementos constitutivos da comunidade que podem ser interpretados como niilistas. Tendo esse dado como ponto de partida, procurarei mostrar de que modo o paradigma imunitário, longe de resolver a deriva niilista que assombra a comunidade, acaba por acirrá-lo; o que leva a articulação (...) com a questão da biopolítica que, paradoxalmente, sendo uma política da vida se desvirtua numa política de morte e aniquilação do sujeito. Por fim, tomando a questão de uma política da negação, implicada na deriva tanatopolítica, apresento como Esposito crê poder solucionar esse perigo, isto é, por uma assunção da potência afirmativa da negação. (shrink)

pretende-se tensionar a tese, difundida no Brasil de que Foucault é um filósofo nietzschiano, mostrando que seu pensamento pode e deve ser visto sempre em confluência com outros pensadores, formando o que se pode chamar de uma comunidade de pensamento. Para isso, busca-se mostrar a singularidade do pensamento de Foucault, seja em relação àquele de Nietzsche, seja a de Husserl, acentuando alguns de seus pontos de convergência e divergência.

O artigo tem por objetivo interpretar como Foucault concebe a possibilidade da cura nos discursos e práticas psicológicas, durante sua fase protoarqueológica. Para atingir tal fim, discorre sobre os dois textos mais importantes dessa fase ? Maladie!Mentale!et!Personnalité e a introdução à Le Rêve et l'?Existence ? evidenciando como nesses textos se desenha uma concepção psicopatológica que deve subsidiar uma prática psicoterápica. Constata-se, no entanto, que reina uma contradição inerente aos dois textos, em que ora se completam, ora conflitam no modo (...) de conceber a doença mental. Terminamos assim por demarcar toda a intensidade dessa contradição, sublinhando a indecisão teórica de Foucault sobre o estatuto da psicologia. (shrink)

This article considers one seemingly compelling justification for immigration restrictions: that they help restrict the brain drain of skilled workers from poor states. For some poor states, brain drain is a severe problem, sapping their ability to provide basic services. Yet this article finds that justifying immigration restrictions on brain drain grounds is far from straightforward. For restrictions to be justified, a series of demanding conditions must be fulfilled. Brain drain does provide a successful argument for some immigration restrictions, but (...) it is an argument that fails to justify restrictions beyond a small minority of cases. (shrink)

Argues that we know without observation or inference at least some of what we are doing intentionally and that this possibility must be explained in terms of knowledge-how. It is a consequence of the argument that knowing how to do something cannot be identified with knowledge of a proposition.

I argue that ignorance of who will die makes a difference to the ethics of killing. It follows that reasons are subject to ‘specificity’: it can be rational to respond more strongly to facts that provide us with reasons than to the fact that such reasons exist. In the case of killing and letting die, these reasons are distinctively particular: they turn on personal acquaintance. The theory of rights must be, in part, a theory of this relation.

Kieran Cronin aims in this book to show how a Christian perspective may have something fruitful to contribute to the language of rights. In so doing, he examines some of the complexities involved in using this language, drawing from literature in moral philosophy and jurisprudence in the process. The novelty of his approach lies in the attempt to distinguish two complimentary aspects within metaethics, aspects which the author calls the 'discursive' and the 'imaginative'. Cronin regards the use of models (...) (which are extended metaphors) as providing a bridge between these two aspects, and the imaginative metaethics which emerges is seen to be rich in possibilities for both secular and Christian understandings of rights-talk. (shrink)

Argues that, while human beings may act "under the guise of the good," this is not true of rational agents, as such. Themes discussed along the way – extending the argument of "Reasons without Rationalism" (Princeton, 2007) – include: desires as appearances of the good, the intelligibility of vice, and the kind of essentialist claim that permits exceptions.